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Seeing through Plato’s Looking Glass.  
Mythos and Mimesis from Republic to Poetics
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(Università di Milano)
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Abstract. This paper revisits Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on mimesis with a special 
emphasis on mythos as an integral part of it. I argue that the Republic’s notorious “mir-
ror argument” is in fact ad hominem: first, Plato likely has in mind Agathon’s mirror 
in Aristophanes’ Thesmoforiazusae, where tragedy is construed as mimesis; second, 
the tongue-in-cheek claim that mirrors can reproduce invisible Hades, when read in 
combination with the following eschatological myth, suggests that Plato was not com-
mitted to a mirror-like view of art; third, the very omission of mythos shows that the 
argument is a self-consciously one-sided one, designed to caricature the artists’ own 
pretensions of mirror-like realism. These points reinforce Stephen Halliwell’s claim that 
Western aesthetics has been haunted by a «ghostly misapprehension» of Plato’s mirror. 
Further evidence comes from Aristotle’s “literary” (as opposed to Plato’s “sociological”) 
discussion: rather than to the “mirror argument”, the beginning of the Poetics points to 
the Phaedo as the best source of information about Plato’s views on poetry.
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However we decide to translate the elusive Greek word mime-
sis, in the context of the present volume there is no need to justify 
its presence in my subtitle. Why mythos, though? Plato’s Republic 
3 conceptualizes poetry as a form of diegesis1, and, as Gérard Gen-
ette (1979) rightly emphasized, does not recognize lyric as a form of 
poetry: nonrepresentational poetry is simply not part of the picture. 
In fact, Republic 2-3 discusses poetry as a form of mythical narra-
tive, with an exclusive focus on tragedy and epic poetry, which hap-
pen to be treated as belonging to one and the same category2. As a 
consequence, mythoi take centre stage throughout, and prove inte-
gral to the very notion of poetry. As for Aristotle’s Poetics, mythos is 
by far the most important part of tragedy, and the poet is famously 
defined as maker of mythoi rather than of verses (9.1251b27-28). 
1 Cf. Republic 3.392c-d discussed below.
2 At 10.607a Homer is famously called «the first and greatest of tragic poets».
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As scholars often remark, in Poetics, as opposed 
to Aristotle’s other works and to classical usage at 
large, mythos acquires the unprecedented meaning 
of plot or structure, and has been often construed 
in proto-narratological terms3.
These sketchy indications should be sufficient to 
realize the importance of mythos for mimesis (and 
vice-versa). However, one last reference to my sub-
title is perhaps in order, as I would like to stress the 
preposition “from”. A comprehensive treatment of 
both Platonic and Aristotelian mimesis, even within 
the limits of Republic and Poetics, is of course out-
side of the question, and I should warn the reader 
that, in accordance with the strict criteria set by 
“Aisthesis”, I will keep footnotes and bibliographical 
references to a minimum. Yet one of the functions 
traditionally connected with introductory papers is 
to take the bull by the horns, that is to broach gen-
eral, even over-debated issues. My strategy will be 
to work on the intersections between mimesis and 
mythos as well as between Plato and Aristotle. My 
hope is to combine references to general problems 
with a few close (and, I hope, at least in part, origi-
nal) readings of specific texts, mostly from Plato’s 
Republic and with a focus on Plato’s mirror in book 
10. I hope I will be able to “see through” it, i.e. to 
provide a better understanding of this celebrated 
image and to trace its underlying background.
When addressing Plato, it is hardly possible 
to steer clear of hermeneutics. It is customary for 
scholars to wonder why Plato wrote dialogues. I 
usually go for a bolder and more Socratic ques-
tion: what is a Platonic dialogue? Aristotle – and 
here is my first “intersection” – comes close to 
addressing such a question when, in the Politics, 
he tells us what the dialogues are like:
τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους 
λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ 
ζητητικόν
Socrates’ logoi are never commonplace; they always 
exhibit grace and originality and inquiry. (Aristotle, 
Politics 2.1265a10-12, transl. Jowett)
3 Cf. e.g. Fusillo [1986], Belfiore [2000] and Zimmermann 
[2009]. More bibliography in Capra [2017].
Aristotle is criticizing the Republic and the 
Laws, so these words refer no doubt to Plato. 
According to this quasi-definition, which Stephen 
Halliwell rightly emphasizes in his discussion of 
Platonic mimesis, the dialogues should be con-
strued as thought-experiments (Halliwell [2002]: 
38). No less interestingly, in the Poetics (1.1247b9-
20) Aristotle classifies the dialogues as mimetic 
works, which he carefully distinguishes from his-
tory and from the assertoric mode of pre-Socratic 
writing, whether in verse or prose. On this view, 
the primary aim of Platonic dialogues is not to 
convey a set of doctrines established once and for 
all, but to stir and provoke the reader. The recep-
tion of the Republic is a famously complicated 
affair, in which anti-Platonic defences of art are 
counterbalanced by the emergence of a number 
of Platonic aesthetics, most memorably discussed 
in Panofsky’s Idea (1960). To judge from this 
paradoxical outcome, Plato’s provocations surely 
hit the mark. Strictly speaking, moreover, Plato’s 
remarks on mimesis, insofar as they are expressed 
in a fictional, mimetic dialogue, are in fact “meta-
mimetic”, something that arguably adds to the 
provocation.
It would be misleading to restrict our under-
standing of Platonic mimesis to the well-known, 
or even notorious, passages of the Republic, all the 
more so if we entertain the idea that the dialogues 
resemble, at least to a certain extent, thought 
experiments. In fact other dialogues make it clear 
that Plato, time and again, endorses the produc-
tion of good images, which are sometimes referred 
to with words from the mimesis family (Gonza-
lez [1998], ch. 5). Yet I have promised to take the 
bull by the horns, so let us face the alleged villain 
of our story, that is mimesis as discussed in the 
Republic.
In books 2-3, a long section is devoted to the 
education of the ‘guardians’, namely the special 
corps of citizens designed to defend and preserve 
the city and its values. It is worth having a look at 
the very beginning of the discussion:
θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται 
τίνα τρόπον; καὶ ἆρά τι προὔργου ἡμῖν ἐστιν αὐτὸ 
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σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν οὗπερ ἕνεκα πάντα 
σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον 
ἐν πόλει γίγνεται; ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ 
συχνὸν διεξίωμεν. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφός, 
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ προὔργου εἶναι 
εἰς τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν. Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ 
φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀφετέον, οὐδ’ εἰ μακροτέρα 
τυγχάνει οὖσα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν 
μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές τε καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ 
παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας.
How are they to be reared and educated? Is not this 
enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the 
greater enquiry which is our final end – how do justice 
and injustice grow up in States? For we do not want 
either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the 
argument to an inconvenient length.’ And Glaucon’s 
brother thought that the enquiry would be of great ser-
vice to us. Then, I said, ‘my dear friend, the task must 
not be given up, even if somewhat long.  Certainly not! 
Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in myth-tell-
ing, and our myth shall be the education of our heroes. 
(Plato, Republic 2.376c-d, transl. Jowett)
Remarkably, the entire discussion revolving 
on the education of the guardians is emphatically 
conceptualized as a “mythological” enterprise.
In what follows, Plato’s focus is very much on 
the mythoi governing mousike, which will be one 
of the pillars of education along with gymnas-
tics: this is far from revolutionary, given that such 
a combination, which is central to Plato’s Laws 
as well, was standard in Athens as well as in the 
Greek world at large. Right from the start, that is 
when the guardians are babies, attention must be 
paid to the content of the mythoi they are exposed 
to. Plato seems to recognize the fictional quality of 
myth by resorting to at least two important words. 
The first one is pseudos: mythoi can be factually 
false, which is acceptable insofar as children are a 
major focus here. Yet there are “beautiful” lies and 
“ugly” lies and this is where the legislator must 
intervene to discipline the activity of the poets 
(Cf. 2. 377d-e, 3.389b-c, 3.414e-415c). The second 
word is the verb platto, to “mould”, which is large-
ly equivalent to Latin fingo. This is used to convey 
two different ideas: on the one hand, one has to 
mould the appropriate mythoi for the education of 
the guardians; on the other, one has to mould the 
guardians themselves. In this way, the Republic, or 
at least this section of the dialogue, is endowed 
with a mythopoietic quality, one that may be seen 
as blurring the boundaries between the legislator 
who moulds the citizens and the poet who moulds 
the mythoi representing the citizens4.
This section of book 2 introduces the long cri-
tique of current poetry that results in the censor-
ship of many passages from tragic and especially 
epic poetry. These verses – so goes Socrates’ argu-
ment – fail to represent the dignified and virtuous 
nature of gods and heroes, with disastrous con-
sequences for the moral education of the guard-
ians. This introductive section explicitly couples 
poetry with painting in a context that foreshadows 
the notion of fiction. Yet it is important to notice 
that no reference is made to mimesis5. Mimesis 
takes centre stage quite abruptly and much later 
in the dialogue6. At the end of the long censor-
ship of poetry, the focus shifts from the contents 
of mythoi to the way and the mode in which they 
are delivered. Let us dwell for a moment on this 
celebrated passage, which is considered to be the 
ancestor of modern narratology:
Τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι ἐχέτω τέλος· τὸ δὲ λέξεως, 
ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅ τε 
λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται. Καὶ ὁ 
Ἀδείμαντος, Τοῦτο, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὐ μανθάνω ὅτι λέγεις. 
Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, δεῖ γε· ἴσως οὖν τῇδε μᾶλλον 
εἴσῃ. ἆρ’ οὐ πάντα ὅσα ὑπὸ μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν 
λέγεται διήγησις οὖσα τυγχάνει ἢ γεγονότων ἢ 
ὄντων ἢ μελλόντων; Τί γάρ, ἔφη, ἄλλο; Ἆρ’ οὖν 
οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἁπλῇ διηγήσει ἢ διὰ μιμήσεως γιγνομένῃ 
ἢ δι’ ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἔτι 
δέομαι σαφέστερον μαθεῖν.
4 Compare e.g. Republic 3. 377c, 6.500d-e and Timaeus 
26e.
5 The only preceding mention of mimetai is found at 373b 
as regards the feverish city.
6 Except for a couple of passing mentions of the related 
terms mimema and mimeisthai, moreover, mimesis is not 
found in the long critique of current poetry that covers 
what remains of book 2 and a significant part of book 
three.
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Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of 
the style; and when this has been considered, both 
matter and manner will have been completely treated.’ 
‘I do not understand what you mean’, said Adeiman-
tus. ‘Then I must make you understand; and perhaps 
I may be more intelligible if I put the matter in this 
way. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and 
poetry is a narration (diegesis) of events, either past, 
present, or to come?’ ‘Certainly’, he replied. ‘And nar-
ration may be either simple narration, or mimesis, or 
a union of the two? That again, he said, I do not quite 
understand. (Plato, Republic 3.392c-d, transl. Jowett).
A few points should be stressed here. When 
it comes to describe poetry, Plato’s top category is 
not mimesis, as many tacitly assume, but diegesis7: 
qua poetry, all poems are first and foremost nar-
ratives, which is why mythos is integral to Plato’s 
views on poetry and mimesis. Secondly, Adei-
mantus is clearly taken aback. Part of this must 
depend on the fact that the very notion of mimesis 
is unclear to him, which is not surprising after all. 
The noun mimesis is never found in the Republic 
before this passage, is rare before Plato and pos-
sibly unknown before Socrates’ time. As we shall 
see, its only pre-Platonic occurrence in reference to 
poetry is found in a funny passage of Aristophanes’ 
Thesmophoriazusae8, where it justifies the transves-
tism of an all too refined and highbrow poet.
In an attempt to clarify, Socrates exemplifies 
the notion of mimesis through the direct speech 
delivered by Chryses in the first rhapsody of the 
Iliad. In doing so, he strongly emphasizes Chryses’ 
old age, something that highlights the need of an 
all-encompassing transformation on the part of 
the poet or performer:
τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει 
καὶ πειρᾶται ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα ποιῆσαι μὴ Ὅμηρον 
δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην 
ὄντα. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὴ πᾶσαν σχεδόν τι οὕτω 
πεποίηται διήγησιν περί τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν 
ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλῃ Ὀδυσσείᾳ παθημάτων. Οὐκοῦν 
διήγησις μέν ἐστιν καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἑκάστοτε λέγῃ 
7 As is shown, most clearly, in Heath [2013], ch. 2.
8 140-156, discussed below.
καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἀλλ’ 
ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ ῥῆσιν ὥς τις ἄλλος ὤν, ἆρ’ οὐ τότε 
ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ λέξιν 
ἑκάστῳ ὃν ἂν προείπῃ ὡς ἐροῦντα; Φήσομεν· τί γάρ; 
Οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ 
κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἄν τις ὁμοιοῖ;
But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, 
and then he does all that he can to make us believe 
that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest himself, 
that is an old man. And in this double form he has 
cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred 
at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the Odyssey.’ 
‘Yes.’ ‘And a narrative (diegesis) it remains both in the 
speeches which the poet recites from time to time and 
in the intermediate passages?’ ‘Quite true.’ ‘But when 
the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not 
say that he assimilates his style to that of the person 
who, as he informs you, is going to speak?’ ‘Certainly.’ 
‘And is it not the case that this assimilation of himself 
to another, either by the use of voice or figure, is the 
imitation of the person whose character he assumes? 
(Plato, Republic 393b-c, transl. Jowett)
Remarkably, we hear of a transformation that 
invests phone, i.e. the voice, and schema, that is 
the “figure”. I use the word “figure” because it 
accommodates an idea that is prominent in the 
Greek corresponding term, namely a strong asso-
ciation with bodily postures as found in the visual 
arts, which from a Greek viewpoint include not 
only painting and sculpture but also poetry, either 
in the form of epic performances (rhapsodes were 
in fact fully-fledged, highly spectacular actors) or 
of theatre productions9. As such, the term sche-
ma is suggestive of psychomotor learning. This 
helps explain Plato’s anxieties about mimesis: later 
in book 3 we hear of how mimetic poetry, in the 
long run, infiltrates and corrupts the soul, all the 
more so when children are exposed to it (395c-e), 
and the corrosive influence of mimesis on the soul 
is a major focus of book 10 as well (605a-606d). 
Against this danger, it is no use to deploy such 
highbrow tricks as allegoric interpretations (hypo-
noiai), which were meant to cleanse poetry of its 
9 On schemata, see Catoni [2008].
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violent and impious features (378e). It is no use, as 
Socrates explains, because the soul, and especially 
a child’s soul, is fatally exposed to the influence 
exerted by poetry, that is – as the general context 
implies – by psychomotor learning through per-
formative schemata. This is why there is no sub-
stantial anachronism in regarding the Republic’s 
approach to mimesis as an ultimately sociological 
and psychophysical one (Cerri [1991]).
So far, I have been stressing a number of points 
that should make us cautious in addressing the dis-
cussion of poetry found in the Republic. To sum-
marize: mimesis is a relatively novel notion, and its 
close, if abrupt, association with poetry is based on 
the strongly performative and narrative character 
of Greek poetry as expressed through “voice” and 
“figures”. This entails a visual and psychophysical 
dimension that we moderns rarely associate with 
poetry. Even so, Plato’s ban on mimetic poetry 
may look like a vaguely paranoid policy, one that is 
often cited in combination with the idea that Plato, 
allegedly a former poet according to the biographi-
cal tradition, was an ultimately schizophrenic char-
acter, whose «attitude is split» (Annas [1998]: 290) 
and prone to «self-censorship» (Blondell [2002]: 
228-245). Such readings, however, rest on surpris-
ingly fragile bases, as I will now try to show.
In book 3, the whole argument closes on 
Socrates’ proposal that only «the pure imitator of 
the decent» should be admitted in the just city 
(397c-d, τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μιμητὴν ἄκρατον). This 
phrase is elusive and would require a very detailed 
discussion, which I cannot offer here. Let me just 
recall that the phrase is often thought to refer pri-
marily to the «decent» mode of diegesis: on this 
view, Socrates is saying that excesses of mimesis 
should be avoided, as if he were referring back to 
the tripartite model that introduces the discussion 
of poetic lexis with a view to advocating the purely 
non-mimetic form of narrative. As a consequence, 
Socrates is taken to endorse only poetry involving 
no or very little mimesis, his ban extending to vir-
tually all forms of existing poetry10. Yet «the pure 
10 This results in an apparent contradiction. As one very 
sensible critic puts it, «P. seems to be caught between the 
imitator of the decent» is not primarily the practi-
tioner of a decent form of diegesis, i.e. with no or 
little mimesis. Rather, he is fact the pure imitator 
of the decent man11. What Socrates is advocating 
here, then, is not a ban on mimetic poetry, but 
the uncompromising imitation of the good man, 
whose temperate behaviour, of course, does not 
require the full array of mimetic voices and fig-
ures mentioned a little earlier. Socrates is arguably 
referring to both contents and modes of poetry, 
that is, he is combining the two strands of the 
discussion so far. If this is correct, what Socrates 
is arguing for is not the demise of mimesis qua 
mimesis.
Further confirmation comes from the Apol-
ogy of Socrates. In an important passage (24c), 
Socrates seems to be actively promoting the mime-
sis of his own persona: young people, he says, are 
more than willing to imitate (mimountai) him, 
which is why the death sentence will not suc-
ceed in killing the Socratic practice of philosophy 
(Blondell [2002]: 86). Now, not only the Phaedo 
but also the Seventh Letter (118a and 324e respec-
tively), in Plato’s own voice, emphatically singles 
out Socrates as the most just man of his time, 
which calls to mind the «decent man» mentioned 
in the Republic. It follows that (most of) Plato’s 
dialogues can be construed, among other things, 
as an outstanding example of “imitatio Socratis”, 
most of which is conducted in the purely mimetic 
mode: pure imitation of the most decent man. If 
correctly interpreted, then, the passage from the 
Republic should be construed as strongly meta-
mimetic in character, as it points to Plato’s own 
mimetic work12. Also, it should be noted that Pla-
to’s interest in the mimesis of «the most just man 
view that mimesis is beneficial provided that its object is 
suitable, and the feeling that there is something potential-
ly harmful about mimesis in itself»  (Murray [1996]:13).
11 Cf. e.g. Lapini [2003], with further bibliography.
12 It is hardly a coincidence that the items and charac-
ters which, according to the Republic, must not be the 
object of direct imitation are found in Plato’s narrated 
(as opposed to dramatic) dialogues only, something that 
reveals Plato’s rationale in choosing either of the two 
forms. See Capra [2003].
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of his time» was not confined to literary composi-
tion. In fact, Plato commissioned for the Academy 
a portrait of Socrates, known as “type A” among 
the Roman copies. As archaeologist Paul Zanker 
has argued, this portrait, with its markedly silenic 
features, was meant as a provocation, something 
that further groups it in with Plato’s mimetic dia-
logues13. Intriguingly, Plato’s mimetic portraits of 
Socrates, both literary and figurative, proved revo-
lutionary.
We now move to book 10. Socrates resumes 
the subject of poetry, which, we hear, can be bet-
ter addressed on the basis of what has been estab-
lished as regards the nature of the soul (i.e. in 
book 4). What can be better assessed, in particu-
lar, is what Socrates refers to as an agreement to 
exclude from the ideal city «all poetry that is 
mimetic» (hose mimetike, 595a). After this noto-
riously bold claim, Socrates admits to his love 
of Homer, which he must resist for the sake of 
truth (595b-c). In an attempt at defining mimesis, 
Socrates then launches into what I will be refer-
ring to as the “mirror argument”, in which «the 
painter is classified as an impostor in what is ulti-
mately an attempt to impugn the poet. The clas-
sification is achieved by an unfair assimilation 
of the painter with the sophistic mirror holder» 
(Bensen Cain [2012]: 188). This is part of Pla-
to’s most notorious critique of poetry and art, 
resulting in the conclusion that mimesis is at two 
removes from truth and unduly nourishes the 
most emotional part of the soul, with disastrous 
consequences for its health and stability. As if he 
were a frustrated lover, Socrates then restates his 
wish that poetry might one day find good argu-
ments to defend her right to be welcomed in the 
ideal city (607d-608a). Until then, however, only 
hymns and encomia will be accepted (607a). Such 
a restrictive policy is what has emerged from the 
discussion – magis amica veritas – but Socrates 
justifies it also in the light of what he famously 
refers to as an old quarrel between poetry and 
13 Cf. Zanker [1995], ch. 1.5. Very strong evidence on the 
placing of the statue in the Academy’s mouseion can be 
found in Speyer [2001].
philosophy (607b). After one last reference to the 
hard task of keeping his love for poetry in check, 
Socrates brings the whole discussion to an end by 
emphasising once again the dangers inherent in 
poetry (608a-b).
Standard readings of book 10 construe it as 
the climax of Plato’s alleged hatred for poetry. Yet, 
as Stephen Halliwell has brilliantly shown in his 
book on mimesis, more nuanced readings do bet-
ter justice to the text as it stands14: for example, 
Socrates’ hope that poetry will find good argu-
ments to defend herself and return from her exile 
is too emphatic and repeatedly stated to be just a 
touch of irony on Plato’s part, and there is ample 
evidence, both within and outside the Republic, 
that Plato was far from conceiving of poetry and 
art as mere duplication of things.
In addition, two points are worth mentioning:
1. As a number of scholars have noted, the ref-
erence to the ban on all mimetic poetry in 
books 2 and 3 is manifestly false. The phrase 
«all mimetic poetry» may refer to the vivid 
description of shameless imitation of all sorts 
of things, something that is vividly described 
in books 2-315.
2. It should be noted that hymns and encomia 
are two very flexible words. In the course of 
the argument, encomium is used for nothing 
less than Homeric poetry. A survey of Plato’s 
usage of the word hymnos, moreover, shows 
that the term, among other things, can indi-
cate very different genres, including tragedy, 
prose, and epic16. To say that only hymns and 
encomia should be admitted is not tantamount 
to ban theatre and epics from the Kallipolis. 
Rather, it points to a reformed kind of poet-
ry capable of praising correctly the virtues of 
gods and heroes.
14 Halliwell [2002], esp. ch. 4.
15 For a forceful defence of the view that all mimetic 
poets are to go, see e.g. Tsouna [2013], with further bib-
liography.
16 Velardi [1991]. The Timaeus-Critias is conceptualized 
as a hymn, implicitly providing a telling example of good 
mimesis. See Regali [2012], in particular 32–39.
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With all of this in mind, let us now move to 
the “mirror argument”, in which mimesis takes 
the meaning of “copy” or “reproduction”. Remark-
ably, the usage of mimesis in book 10 seems to be 
at odds with what we find in books 2-3, where 
the word could be rendered with “impersona-
tion” or the likes17. However, Socrates now claims 
that painters and poets produce copies of arte-
facts, which in turn are copies of ideal paradigms 
– something that many scholars (mis?)take for the 
so-called Platonic Forms. Whatever the metaphys-
ical import of the discussion, mimesis here means 
something like reproduction/copy of objects18. 
Socrates implies that artists take a pride in their 
optical reproduction of anything they like, and 
yet – he maintains – this is no reason to brag. We 
thus come to the notorious mirror, an argument 
that, in the words of Gombrich, «haunted the phi-
losophy of art ever since»19:
ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ οὗτος χειροτέχνης οὐ μόνον πάντα οἷός 
τε σκεύη ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα 
ἅπαντα ποιεῖ καὶ ζῷα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τά τε ἄλλα 
καὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ 
θεοὺς καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου 
ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται. Πάνυ θαυμαστόν, ἔφη, 
λέγεις σοφιστήν. Ἀπιστεῖς; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. καί μοι εἰπέ, τὸ 
παράπαν οὐκ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτος δημιουργός, 
ἢ τινὶ μὲν τρόπῳ γενέσθαι ἂν τούτων ἁπάντων 
ποιητής, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἄν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅτι κἂν αὐτὸς 
οἷός τ’ εἴης πάντα ταῦτα ποιῆσαι τρόπῳ γέ τινι; Καὶ 
τίς, ἔφη, ὁ τρόπος οὗτος; Οὐ χαλεπός, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, 
ἀλλὰ πολλαχῇ καὶ ταχὺ δημιουργούμενος, τάχιστα δέ 
17 The term is, in fact, extremely complex:  Halliwell 
(2002) distinguishes between no fewer than six differ-
ent semantic areas pertaining to Platonic mimesis (cf. pp. 
46–50).
18 Given that identification, in ancient performative prac-
tices, entails the reproduction of exterior postures known 
as schemata, the two prevalent meanings of mimesis 
(books 2-3 vs. book 10) can in fact be reconciled. See 
Leszl [2007]: 254–255. With its theatrical pedigree, mime-
sis is integral both to Plato’s cave and to Plato’s hypoth-
esis of the Forms, as Palumbo (2008) has put forward. 
I cannot address here the much-discussed relationship 
between Republic 10 and the Sophist. For a reliable intro-
duction to the problem, see e.g. Notomi [2011].
19 Gombrich [1977]: 83. Quoted in Halliwell [2002]: 133.
που, εἰ ’θέλεις λαβὼν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῇ· 
ταχὺ μὲν ἥλιον ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ 
δὲ γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ σαυτόν τε καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ σκεύη 
καὶ φυτὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο.
This very same handicraftsman is able to make not 
only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, 
himself and all other things – the earth and heaven, 
and the gods, and all the things which are in heaven 
as well as all of the things found under the earth, in 
Hades.’ ‘He must be an amazing sophist and no mis-
take.’ ‘You are incredulous, aren’t you? Do you mean 
that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one 
sense there might be a maker of all these things but 
in another not? Can’t you see that there is a way in 
which you could make them all yourself ?’ ‘What 
way?’ ‘An easy way enough; or rather, there are many 
ways in which the feat might be quickly and eas-
ily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning 
a mirror round and round – you would soon enough 
make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and 
yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the 
other things of which we were just now speaking. 
(Plato, Republic 596c-e, transl. Jowett)
An elementary application of the principle of 
charity should warn anyone against the (textually 
unwarranted) conclusion that Plato was commit-
ted to such a naïf position, namely that the com-
plex fabric of poetry and art can be ever reduced 
to optical reproduction20. Besides, it would be 
easy to produce counter-examples: other passages 
in other dialogues and in the Republic itself tell a 
very different story21, and even the silenic portrait 
of Socrates placed in the Academy was not meant 
as a realistic ‘copy’: as archaeologist Luca Giuliani 
20 Cf. Halliwell [2002]: 136. «It is crucial, therefore, to 
notice two things that the mirror simile (and its sequel) 
does not say or entail: first, that all painting actually pur-
ports to be a “mirroring” of the world, in the sense of 
striving for optimum optical fidelity to the appearances 
of things; second, that painters always or even normally 
aim to represent actual models in the world (a supposi-
tion that we have seen would clash with other passages of 
the Republic)».
21 Cf. e.g. Cratylus 430a-431d,  Laws 2.656-657 and 
7.799a-b (on Egyptian art, i.e. on stylization as a valuable 
option). See Halliwell [2002]: 45-46 and 126-129.
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(1997) has shown, it was rather a self-conscious 
ideological construction.
I agree with Stephen Halliwell that the “mirror 
argument” is a provocation tinged with satire and 
humour, and I refer the reader to his convincing 
discussion (Halliwell [2002], ch. 4). I would add 
that Plato’s provocation can be more fully appreci-
ated if we bear in mind two points that were argu-
ably as obvious for Plato’s contemporaries as they 
are hard to pick for us moderns.
To begin with, in classical Athens portable 
mirrors were the exclusive province of women, as 
is abundantly shown by both literary and icono-
graphic evidence (Frontisi-Ducroux, Vernant 
[1997]). As a consequence, our passage has a com-
ic quality that has gone unnoticed: in spite of the 
role played by mirrors in Renaissance painting, 
envisaging the all-male Greek society of tragedi-
ans, painters and sophists toying with a portable 
mirror is a bit like, say, depicting the Wehrmacht 
armed with pink bras.
Secondly, the idea that art is a mirror-like 
activity (whatever that may imply) was already 
current in Plato’s time, and this is a point that may 
be further emphasized. On the iconographic side, 
many anecdotes extol great painters for their abil-
ity to reproduce appearances in such a way as to 
make them indistinguishable from the real thing 
– they are famously discussed by Panofsky in the 
first chapter of his seminal book Idea (Panofsky 
[1960]). As for poetry, some time before Plato 
tried his hand at the Republic, the sophist Alcid-
amas praised the Odyssey for being «a beautiful 
mirror of life» (note that both “life” and “Odyssey” 
are feminine in Greek)22. As early as the first half 
of the 5th Century, moreover, Pindar had com-
pared poetry to the power of a mirror reflecting 
great deeds only on the condition that the goddess 
Mnemosyne activates it23.
Of course, we should never forget that Pla-
to’s main target is tragedy, and it is a pity we 
22 In Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.3, 1406b12–13. Further bibliog-
raphy in Halliwell [2002]: 133.
23 Nemean Odes 7.12-16. Cf. Loscalzo [1996] for a full 
discussion, with added bibliography.
know so little as to how theatre people pro-
moted and defended their art in the time of 
Socrates and Plato, not least because tragedies, 
set as they are in a distant, pre-theatrical past, 
contain no overt reference to theatre itself. 
However, the earliest occurrence of the word 
mimesis in relation to poetry has an interest-
ing surprise in store. I am referring to the Aris-
tophanic scene mentioned above, in which 
Euripides’ uncouth relative questions the virility 
of the tragic poet Agathon, whose wardrobe is, 
to say the least, ambiguous:
Κη […] τίς δαὶ κατρόπτου καὶ ξίφους κοινωνία;
 σύ τ’ αὐτός, ὦ παῖ, πότερον ὡς ἀνὴρ τρέφει;
καὶ ποῦ πέος; ποῦ χλαῖνα; ποῦ Λακωνικαί;
ἀλλ’ ὡς γυνὴ δῆτ’; εἶτα ποῦ τὰ τιτθία;
τί φῄς; τί σιγᾷς; ἀλλὰ δῆτ’ ἐκ τοῦ μέλους
ζητῶ σ’, ἐπειδή γ’ αὐτὸς οὐ βούλει φράσαι;
Αγ. ὦ πρέσβυ πρέσβυ, τοῦ φθόνου μὲν τὸν ψόγον
ἤκουσα, τὴν δ’ ἄλγησιν οὐ παρεσχόμην·
ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ἐσθῆθ’ ἅμα γνώμῃ φορῶ.
χρὴ γὰρ ποιητὴν ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰ δράματα
ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, πρὸς ταῦτα τοὺς τρόπους ἔχειν.
αὐτίκα γυναικεῖ’ ἢν ποιῇ τις δράματα,
μετουσίαν δεῖ τῶν τρόπων τὸ σῶμ’ ἔχειν.
Κη. οὐκοῦν κελητίζεις, ὅταν Φαίδραν ποιῇς;
Αγ. ἀνδρεῖα δ’ ἢν ποιῇ τις, ἐν τῷ σώματι
ἔνεσθ’ ὑπάρχον τοῦθ’. ἃ δ’ οὐ κεκτήμεθα,
μίμησις ἤδη ταῦτα συνθηρεύεται.
MNESILOCHUS […] What relation has a mirror to 
a sword? And you yourself, who are you? Do you pre-
tend to be a man? Where is your tool, pray? Where 
is the cloak, the footgear that belong to that sex? Are 
you a woman? Then where are your breasts? Answer 
me. But you keep silent. Oh! just as you choose; your 
songs display your character quite sufficiently. 
AGATHON Old man, old man, I hear the shafts of 
jealousy whistling by my ears, but they do not hit me. 
My dress is in harmony with my thoughts. A poet 
must adopt the nature of his characters. Thus, if he is 
placing women on the stage, he must contract all their 
habits in his own person. 
MNESILOCHUS Then you make love horse-fashion 
when you are composing a Phaedra. 
AGATHON If the heroes are men, everything in him 
will be manly. What we don’t possess by nature, we 
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must acquire by imitation. (transl. “The Athenian 
Society”, London 1912)
This funny scene features both the novel word 
mimesis and a portable mirror, which is clear-
ly construed as a symbol of femininity and is 
apparently an instrument employed by the tragic 
poet to achieve mimesis, i.e. feminization24. Even 
though he presumably uses his mirror for self-
inspection rather than to reproduce reality, the 
effeminate poet Agathon may be seen as the direct 
ancestor of Plato’s painter-poet-sophist brandish-
ing a mirror that gives life to his passive art. If one 
discounts such comic overtones, it is very tempt-
ing to borrow Shakespeare’s motto, when Ham-
let says that actors should «hold the mirror up to 
nature»25, or – to quote a text discussed elsewhere 
in this volume – Diderot’s view of the actor’s art as 
«une glace toujours disposée à montrer les objets 
et à les montrer avec la même précision, la même 
force et la même vérité»26. If such was the boast of 
poets and artists, in conclusion, we may construe 
Socrates’ mirror as an ad hominem argument, a 
provocation directed against the world of theatre 
and its growing ambitions of realism, which were 
particularly prominent in the theatre of Euripides, 
as Aristophanes’ Frogs suggests. Reflecting reality 
is all your lofty art can achieve? Then you might 
as well brandish a woman’s mirror and hold it up 
to nature. Yet this is not all.
The list of things that the artist is said to be 
able to reproduce contains one item that could 
not possibly be captured by a mirror, and this is 
Hades, the underworld, which the Greeks etymol-
ogized as «the invisible place»27. Unsurprisingly, 
24 The import and meaning of mimesis in this scene is a 
much-debated issue. For a first orientation, see Saetta-
Cottone [2016]: 186 ff.
25 Hamlet III, ii, l. 22. Still more than Pindar’s and Alcid-
amas’ mirrors, Hamlet’s is of course much discussed, as 
it may not point to narrow realism. Its scholarly fortune 
owes much to Abrams’ seminal The Mirror and the Lamp 
[Abrams 1953].
26 See  M. Ortega, this volume, pp. 107-116. 
27 While criticising it, Cratylus 404b testifies to the popu-
larity of this etymology.
the item is not found in the second list, which 
refers directly to the mirror. Yet Socrates explic-
itly claims that the mirror list is coextensive with 
the artist list. Why? Was Plato snoozing when he 
wrote this passage? Hardly so.
The Republic famously ends with an escha-
tological myth28, which is clearly presented as a 
refashioning of Homer’s underworld, complete 
with direct mimesis of speech29. It is all the more 
interesting to note that the closing myth con-
sists precisely in the item that we found missing 
in the mirror list, that is the invisible afterworld. 
As a sample of good mimesis, the myth cannot be 
reduced to any narrow, mirror-like notion of art 
and it is perhaps no coincidence that the word 
mythos, which features so prominently as Socrates 
discusses mimesis in Republic 2-3, is never found 
in the discussion of mimesis in book 1030. Interest-
ingly, the Republic’s very first mention of mythos 
refers precisely to the terrifying and widespread 
accounts of Hades (οἱ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν 
ἐν Ἅιδου) that haunt Cephalus’ old age (330d). 
This foreshadows the closing myth, whose func-
tion is precisely to displace those stories, and 
highlights the deliberate deficiency of the mirror 
argument.
To put it jokingly, not only has Plato provid-
ed the “mirror argument” with a distinctly com-
ic note: what is more, by listing invisible Hades 
among the things supposedly reflected by mirrors, 
and by severing mythos from mimesis, he has also 
inserted a seemingly “invisible” bug designed to 
undermine it from within.
Let us now move, much more briefly, to Aris-
totle. I refer once again to Stephen Halliwell, who 
28 This contradiction was criticized already in the third 
century B.C. by Epicurus’ pupil Colotes. See Cerri [2000]: 
25.
29 See e.g. Segal [1978]. More bibliography in Capra 
[2010]: 201.
30 Halliwell ([2005]: 54) suggests in passing that «il est 
manifestement impossible de voir le reflet des dieux ou 
des Enfers dans un miroir matériel, mais ces sujets sont 
bien entendu indispensables pour les mythes dont traites 
les poètes et les peintres». The point I make here proves 
him right.
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convincingly advocates a dual model for Aristo-
telian mimesis: on the one hand, artistic repre-
sentations exhibit world-like properties, some-
thing that points to mimesis in the sense of both 
“impersonation” and “reproduction”; on the other 
hand, mimesis produces «objects that possess a 
distinctive [...] rationale of their own» (Halliwell 
[2002]: 152), which is what makes poetry more 
philosophical than history, as the Poetics famously 
says. Mimesis is integral to human behaviour, but 
refined mimesis in the form of poetry and art ends 
up developing a partly autonomous status.
At least in part, such an autonomous status 
depends on an altogether new way of looking 
at Greek poetry, which reflects Aristotle’s anti-
Platonic predilection for books and the written 
word as the foundation of philosophy31. Time and 
again, Aristotle makes it clear that he conceptual-
izes Greek plays and poems as self-contained units 
(i.e. books) rather than as parts of the performa-
tive, mythical and religious continuum inher-
ent in the polis’ public festivals32: as one critic 
puts it, «the organicism that Aristotle took from 
Plato and adapted to his formal and teleologi-
cal view of poetry gave poetic criticism some-
thing of the objectivity of anatomy» (Ford [2002]: 
266). To Aristotle, reading is a satisfactory way 
of consuming and – more importantly – dissect-
ing plays, and the Poetics does not have much to 
say on the effects of theatre on the city, nor on 
“voice” (phone) or “figures” (schemata). Gone is 
Plato’s sociological approach, as gone is any anxi-
ety associated with psychomotor learning as a 
result of tragic performances33: in fact, Aristotle 
goes so far as to claim that competent audiences 
have no need for schemata (26.1462a2-5). This 
completely new way of looking at theatre is in 
keeping with the novel meaning Aristotle ends up 
giving to mythos, as I mentioned at the beginning, 
31 Cf. Trabattoni [2005] and Billault [2015].
32 Cf. the illuminating introduction in Lanza [1987].
33 I purposely leave out of consideration the elusive 
notion of katharsis, which may be construed as the cul-
mination of the musical education described in the Poli-
tics: cf. Donini [2008]: CVII-CXIII and my own reserva-
tions as expressed in Capra [2017].
and results in an even stronger interconnection 
between mythos and mimesis, although they are 
both seen in a completely different light.
In Aristotle’s literary (as opposed to performa-
tive) world, mythos and mimesis turn out to be 
even more important and interconnected notions 
than they are in Republic 2-3: unlike Plato’s, Aris-
totle’s top category to define poetry is not diegesis 
but mimesis itself; moreover, mythos is the «soul of 
tragedy», the condicio sine qua non for the exist-
ence of poetry. Even more striking is Aristotle’s 
“definition” of mythos as mimesis of an action:
ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις, λέγω 
γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων
And the imitation of the action is mythos. By this 
term mythos I mean the organisation of the events 
(synthesin tōn pragmatōn)… (Aristotle, Poetics 
6.1450a4-5, transl. Halliwell)
Mythos, then, is in fact mimesis, and «mimetic 
(art)», in the Poetics, can work as a synonym for 
poetry itself34. Insofar as the object of mimesis 
has become something more abstract and formal, 
the relationship between these three overlapping 
terms, namely mythos, mimesis and poiesis, may at 
times look like one of quasi-identity.
To conclude with one last instance of Platonic/
Aristotelian “intersection”, it should be noted that 
the “Aristotelian” meaning of mythos as «mime-
sis of an action» does not emerge immediately in 
the Poetics. As I have argued elsewhere, the very 
beginning of the work, despite its ultimately anti-
Platonic outcome, has a strange Platonic flavour35. 
Aristotle wants to explore the force and the organ-
ization of mythoi, something that is crucial for 
the success of poetry (πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς 
μύθους εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἕξειν ἡ ποίησις, Poetics 
1.1447a9-10). This closely recalls the beginning of 
the Phaedo (61b) where Socrates devises a kind of 
34 Cf. 5,1249b6, where mimetike (scil. techne) stands for 
poetry.
35 Cf. the conclusion of Capra [2014]. For a general com-
parison between Aristotelian and Platonic mythos, cf. 
Frazier [2013].
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poetics in miniature, when he states that mythos is 
crucial for the very definition of poetry (ἐννοήσας 
ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, 
ποιεῖν μύθους). Yet Socrates is speaking of poetic 
images, and he exemplifies this traditional meaning 
of mythos through Aesop – he claims he has con-
verted to poetry to obey a dream. Accordingly, he 
has composed a hymn to Apollo and put in verse 
a bunch of Aesopic fables while in prison. By con-
trast, in the following chapters of the Poetics Aristo-
tle takes leave of old myth and of Aesop’s speaking 
animals and explores mythos insofar as it provides 
plays with their structure, which he dissects in a 
quasi-anatomical fashion 36. Yet Aristotle’s termi-
nology and certain turns of phrase clearly call to 
mind the Phaedo. I take this as evidence that Aris-
totle sensed the poetological import of the passage 
in question when he first addressed the question of 
myth and mimesis, or maybe he just had first-hand 
knowledge of its intended meaning. Could it be the 
case that Plato’s truer “poetics” is not to be found 
in the Republic’s criticism of mimesis but, rather, 
in Socrates’ conversion to poetry on the eve of his 
death and in a trilogy – Apology, Crito, and Phaedo 
– designed to promote imitatio Socratis? As I said, 
I have tried to take the bull by the horns, but, one 
may suspect, that was not the right bull after all.
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